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Abstract
This paper introduces gender discrimination and population growth
into a model of political economy. It is assumed that households are
family dynasties and the government keeps up the army for the case
of political instability in the country. It is shown that there are eco-
nomic limits to conscription from young men. Therefore, to ensure
the sufficient supply of the men in the conscription age, the govern-
ment boosts population growth though hampering the participation
of women in production. Some empirical evidence on the interdepen-
dence of political instability and population growth is provided.
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1 Introduction
Why do politically unstable economies generate high population growth rates
and sideline women from productive work? In this paper, we consider this
question in a model where the government maintains internal stability by the
army but attempts at the same time to be re-elected.
The rulers have always collected armies to hedge against internal or ex-
ternal risks. In particular, they have been interested in the security of their
citizens but also their own interests to stay in power. There are two ways of
expanding the military. In the short run, conscriptions can be increased, but
this inevitably harms private agents at an increasing rate. In the long run,
the government can also widen the demographic base for the army.
Even if the risk for open war seems to be decreasing in developed coun-
tries, many less developed countries have experienced a continuous risk for
riots and civil wars. The number of annual armed conflicts steadily increased
from less than twenty in 1950 to almost fifty in 1991 but decreased again
from 1991 to 2000 (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004).1 On the other hand,
the average demographic growth was over 2.1% in less developed countries
during period 1950-2000. Hence, the population in these countries has almost
tripled (United Nations 2003). Could high population growth and political
instability be interrelated? Do governments promote population growth?
In the literature of political instability, several reasons has been suggested
for this instability. In the well-known article of Easterly and Levine (1997),
ethnic diversity encourages poor policy, political instability and poor eco-
nomic performance. According to Olsson (2004), abundant natural resources
such as diamonds can be the source of political unrest. Henderson and Singer
(2000) suggest that “semi-democracy”– in the absence of plain oppression or
legitimate channels for dispute resolution – causes crises.
In their models of civil wars, Grossman (1995), Azam (1995), and Collier
and Hoeﬄer (1998) consider a rebel who, facing the costs and rewards of the
war and the probability of a victory, either behaves peacefully or embarks on
a civil war. Grossman (1991) examines a general equilibrium model of both
the rebel and the ruler, while Grossman and Kim (1995) consider the effect
1This is so even if during this period the military expenditure still exceeded 4% in 18
countries only in Africa and Asia (SIPRI 2004).
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of differences in defensive and offensive weapons. Azam (2003) discusses
the case where the government pays its potential opponent in return for not
engaging in a civil war.
In this paper, we consider the incumbent government which tries to stay
in power in the presence of political instability – riots, ethnic conflicts or civil
wars – which can be prevented by building up armies. In particular, we focus
on the long run demographic effects of the government’s military capacity.
We consider political instability but not an open war. Hence, no war-related
deaths are present.
With the risk of foreign intrusion, the absolute size of the military is
the relevant deterrent. With the risk of internal conflicts, the government
needs a large military relative to the population to keep the society peaceful.
We concentrate on the latter case. Because the government faces the risk
of being replaced in a peaceful election, it has to keep the conscription rate
tolerable. Population growth increases the proportion of younger generation
from which the army is recruited. On the basis of a theoretical model, we
construct an empirically robust association between population growth and
the proportion of military persons out of total population.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In sections 2-4, we
establish a theoretical model which explains the link between population
growth, gender discrimination and the size of the military. Empirical evi-
dence is given in section 5.
2 Production and capital accumulation
Consider an economy with identical households and one homogeneous good.
The households are modelled as dynastic families which contain people of
all generations. The representative household has capital K and population
L. Half of the population is male and the other half female workers. Male
and female labor are different inputs in production. The household allocates
a proportion b of female workers to child-rearing. Goods Y and children
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L˙
.
= dL/dt, where t is time, are therefore produced as follows:
Y = F
(
K,L/2, (1− b)L/2) = F(k, 1/2, (1− b)/2)L,
F1 > 0, F2 > 0, F3 > 0, F11 < 0, F13 > 0, F22 < 0, F33 < 0, (1)
L˙ = γbL/2 or n=˙L˙/L = γb/2, (2)
where L/2 is male labor, (1− b)L/2 female labor in production, aL/2 female
labor in child-rearing, γ the constant level of productivity in child-rearing,
n the growth rate of population, F (·) a linearly homogenous and strictly
concave production function, and the subscript i ∈ {1, 2, 3} denotes the
partial derivative of F with respect to the ithe argument from the left.
We consider a developing country where the government does not have
proper tax instruments. For this reason, it controls the behaviour of the peo-
ple through norms and religious rules (e.g. veils, restrictions of movements).
We assume that the government discriminates women when they participate
in the labor force. This can be modelled as follows. The government sets
a fine τ to female labor in production and distributes the revenue from this
evenly among all L/2 men in the economy. We assume that soldiers are di-
rectly supported by their families, so that the government does not collect
taxes to pay their salaries. Because capital is the only asset in the economy,
the household’s budget constraint can then be written in terms of capital
accumulation as follows:
K˙
.
= dK/dt = Y + hL/2− cL− τ(1− b)L/2, (3)
where h is the subsidy to men and cL total consumption.
Noting (1), we obtain b = 2n/γ. To make the solution easier, we change
the model into per capita terms and define the function
G(n, k)
.
=
Y
L
− nk = F
(
k,
1
2
,
1− b
2
)
− nk = F
(
k,
1
2
,
1
2
− n
γ
)
− nk,
Gn = −F3/γ − k < 0, Gk = F1 − n, Gnn = F33/γ2 < 0,
Gkk = F11 < 0, Gnk = −F13/γ − 1 < 0, k .= K/L, (4)
where the subscripts n and k denote the partial derivatives with respect to
arguments n and k, respectively. Noting (4), we can transform the equation
(3) into then the form
k˙ = Y/L+ h/2− c− τ(1− b)/2− nk = G(n, k) + h/2− c− τ(1/2− n). (5)
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3 The military and the household
In standard models of population growth, the representative household de-
rives utility from per capita consumption c and the number of children n.2 In
this paper, we assume that “children” are directly at the age of conscription
without time lags. A model with such a lag would be excessively complicated
to obtain analytical results.
In the absence of immigration and mortality, there is one-to-one corre-
spondence between the rate of population growth and the fertility rate. To
defend itself against the risk of a conflict or coup the covernment has to
collect armies the member of which are supplied by households out of its
young men nL/2. Let the conscription rate be a. The size of the military is
then anL/2, while (1−a)nL/2 young men stay at home. It is uncomfortable
for a family to send its young men to military service, because these dislike
the inconveniences of the military life and miss their relatives at home. The
young men are also unrest of the risk of a conflict even during the peace.
On the basis of the discussion above, the household’s utility is a function
of consumption per capita, c, and young people in the family relative to
total labor, (1− a/2)n. We specify the representative household’s objective
functional in the form
U =
∫ ∞
0
1
1− σ
{
c1−σ + θ
[(
1− a
2
)
n
]1−σ
− 1
}
e−ρtdt, (6)
where t is time, σ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞) the inverse of the constant intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, ρ > 0 the constant rate of time preference, and the
constant θ > 0 gives the weight for young people in household preferences.
The household takes the fine τ , the subsidy h, the conscription rate a and
the fertility rate as given. The household chooses consumption per capita, c,
and the fertility rate n to maximize its utility (6) given its budget (3). Omit-
ting terms which are constants for the household, we obtain the Hamiltonian
corresponding to this maximization as follows:
H = (1−σ)−1{c1−σ+θ[(1−a/2)n]1−σ}+λ[G(n, k)+h/2−c−τ(1/2−n)], (7)
2Cf. Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) and Becker (1981). The number of children is approx-
imately two if the population growth rate n is zero.
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where the co-state variable λ evolves according to
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H/∂k = [ρ−Gk(n, k)]λ. (8)
The first-order conditions corresponding to the household’s maximization are
c−σ = λ, ∂H/∂n = θ(1− a/2)1−σn−σ + λ[Gn(n, k) + τ ] = 0. (9)
Given the left-hand equation, we can replace λ by c as the co-state variable
and transform the equation (8) into
c˙/c = −(1/σ)λ˙/λ = (1/σ)[Gk(n, k)− ρ]. (10)
From (4) and (9) it follows that
∂2H
∂n∂k
= c−σGnk < 0,
∂2H
∂n∂c
= −(Gn + τ)σc−σ−1 = θ
(
1− a
2
)1−σ
n−σ
σ
c
> 0.
Given these inequalities and the second-order condition ∂2H/∂n2 < 0, the
comparative statics of the right-hand equation in (9) yields
n = n˜(k, c),
∂n˜
∂k
= − ∂
2H
∂n∂k
/
∂2H
∂n2
< 0,
∂n˜
∂c
= − ∂
2H
∂n∂c
/
∂2H
∂n2
> 0. (11)
In the definition (4) of the function G, the first term F is concave but
the second term −nk convex in (n, k). This implies that G may be convex in
(n, k) and there may exist multiple steady states for the system (5) and (10).3
To eliminate this possibility, we restrict the analysis in the neighborhood of
the steady state in which the Hamiltonian is concave in (n, k). Noting (11),
we obtain that the system (5) and (10) has a unique adjustment path for
given initial capital stock, a saddle point, only if
∂c˙
∂k
=
c
σ
[
Gkk +Gnk
∂n˜
∂k
]
< 0.
We consider the system only in the steady state. Noting (5), (10) and the
right-hand equation in (9), we obtain the steady-state conditions as follows:
G(n, k) + h/2− c− τ(1/2− n) = 0, Gk(n, k) = ρ,
θ(1− a/2)1−σn−σ + λ[Gn(n, k) + τ ] = 0, (12)
3This property of the endogenous-fertility models is explained e.g. in Palivos (1995).
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where c, n and k are endogenous and τ and h exogenous variables. The
comparative statics of the system (12) (see the Appendix) then gives
n = N(τ, h, a), ∂N/∂τ > 0, ∂N/∂h > 0. (13)
Hence, given the conscription rate a, a greater degree of discrimination for
women (a higher τ and a higher h) increases the proportion of women in the
production of children.
4 The government
The government can loose its power for two reasons. First, the elections
are arranged from time to time and, to get re-elected, the government has
to satisfy the needs of the households. Second, due to political instability,
the government always faces the risk of a coup, a conflict, or a civil war,
which removes it from power. Therefore, the government needs an army.
With internal instability, the military must be proportional to population.4
For these reasons, the government’s target function is a combination of the
utility function of the representative household and the size of the military.
Although the proportion a of soldiers can be significant out of young men,
their proportion out of all men is so small that in can be ignored. Hence,
total male labor L/2 can still be an input in the production function (1).
We specify the government’s utility as the private utility (6) extended by
the population share of the military, an/2:
W =
∫ ∞
0
1
1− σ
{
c1−σ + θ
[(
1− a
2
)
n
]1−σ
+ ψ
(a
2
n
)1−σ
− 1
}
e−ρtdt, (14)
where the constant ψ > 0 represents the risk of internal conflicts. Private
and government utilities, (6) and (14), would coincide for ψ = 0.
Because the fines on female labor are distributed among the men, we
obtain τ(1− b)L/2 = hL/2 or h/2 = (1− b)τ/2 = (1/2− n)τ . Inserting this
into the equation (5) yields the accumulation of the capital-labor ratio k as
k˙ = G(n, k)− c. (15)
4We assume that the government needs its army for internal rather than for external
security. The proper deterrent against internal conflicts (i.e., banditry, riots, a civil war,
etc.) is the size of the military relative to population, an/2, while that against intrusion
from abroad is the absolute size of the military.
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The government decides what proportion a of young men is taken in the
army. Given (13), the government is able to control n by discrimination.
Hence, the government maximizes its utility (14) by choosing the size of
military, a, the rate of population growth, n, and consumption per capita
c, subject to capital accumulation (15). Omitting constants, we obtain the
Hamiltonian corresponding to this problem as follows:
HG =
1
1− σ
[
c1−σ + θ
(
1− a
2
)1−σ
n1−σ + ψ
(
a
n
2
)1−σ]
+ µ[G(n, k)− c],
(16)
where the co-state variable µ evolves according to
µ˙ = ρµ− ∂HG/∂k = [ρ−Gk(n, k)]µ. (17)
To simplify the analysis, we define the functions
A(θ, ψ)
.
= max
a
[
θ(1− a/2)1−σ + ψ(a/2)1−σ], ∂A/∂θ < 0, ∂A/∂ψ > 0,
a(ψ/θ)
.
= argmax
a
A(θ, ψ), a′ > 0. (18)
In other words, higher risk of conflicts (i.e., a higher ψ) increases, but greater
weight for young people (i.e., a higher θ) decreases the rate of constription,
a. The Hamiltonian (16) takes the form
HG = (1− σ)−1(c1−σ + An1−σ)+ µ[G(n, k)− c]. (19)
The first-order conditions for the government’s maximization are given by
c−σ = µ, ∂HG/∂n = An−σ + µGn(n, k) = 0. (20)
Given (20), we can replace µ by c as the co-state variable and transform the
equation (8) into
c˙/c = −(1/σ)µ˙/µ = (1/σ)[Gk(n, k)− ρ]. (21)
From (4) and (20) it follows that
∂2HG
∂n∂k
= c−σGnk < 0,
∂2HG
∂n∂c
= −Gnσc−σ−1 = An−σσ
c
> 0.
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Given these inequalities and the second-order condition ∂2H/∂n2 < 0, the
comparative statics of the right-hand equation in (9) yields
n = nˆ(k, c),
∂nˆ
∂k
= − ∂
2H
∂n∂k
/
∂2H
∂n2
< 0,
∂nˆ
∂c
= − ∂
2H
∂n∂c
/
∂2H
∂n2
> 0. (22)
Noting (11), we obtain that the system (5) and (10) has a unique adjustment
path for given initial capital stock, a saddle point, only if
∂c˙
∂k
=
c
σ
[
Gkk +Gnk
∂nˆ
∂k
]
< 0.
We consider the system only in the steady state. Noting (15), (21) and (20),
we obtain the steady-state conditions as c = G(n, k) and
Gk(n, k) = ρ, An
−σG(n, k)σ +Gn(n, k) = 0. (23)
In the system (23), variables n and k are endogenous and A is exogenous.
By the comparative statics of this system (see the Appendix), we obtain
dn/dA > 0. This and (18) yield the following result:
Proposition. (i) Higher risk of conflicts (i.e., an increase in ψ) increases
the discrimination of women in the labor force, the fertility rate n
and the size of the military, an/2.
(ii) A greater weight for young people in the families (i.e., an increase in θ)
decreases the population growth rate n.
These results can be explained as follows. When the government have
incentives to expand the military, it conscripts more young men. The less
young people are needed in families, the higher can the conscription rate
a. Because there is, however, an economic limit for conscription – the lack
of young men in the end harms families – the government must ensure the
long-run supply of young men. Discrimination imposed by the government
compels some of the women change the labor force into child-rearing. This
increases fertility and the average number of young men in the long run.
Assume that there is an increase in the risk of conflict (i.e., ψ increases).
To hedge against this risk the government increases the conscription rate a.
On the other hand, the government faces the risk of not being re-elected by
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the dissatisfied citizens, who had to turn their members to the army. For-
tunately, increased labor market discrimination provides a way out of the
dilemma. Women’s retreat from the labor force naturally decreases house-
hold’s income and consumption but new family members compensate this.
In the new equilibrium, the increased conscription rate is outweighed by a
higher number of young people. Hence, if the government can induce an
increased population growth rate, its need to increase the conscription rate
less than in the case of no population growth.
5 Some empirical evidence
The model above predicts that countries experiencing high risks of conflicts
generate high population growth rates. However, because we abandoned the
time lag from the birth to the age of conscription, this prediction must now
be re-interpreted. In the real world, it takes almost 20 years for newborns
to growth up to potential soldiers. On the other hand, it is well known that
recently experienced risks affect evaluations on future risks. Hence, we may
well assume that if the current risk of conflicts is high, a forward-looking
government has every incentive to promote fertility. High military spending
then reveals that the government’s expectations on future risks are high.
On the basis of the above discussion, we use the military share
(MILPERS ) – i.e. the proportion of military personnel out of total popula-
tion – as the proxy of political risks in future. In order to test the prediction
of the model, want to regress the annual population growth rate (POPGR)
against the military share. We collect data for years 1989-1999 for 72 low
and middle income countries with population larger than one million from
World Bank (2002).5 The data availability dictates the years. We estimate
POPGR = α+ β ·MILPERS + γ ·X + ε, (24)
in which X is the set of variables to be controlled for. To get started, we first
forget X and derive the ordinary least square estimate β = 0.145 with the
t−value 3.42 which is statistically significant at 0.1% level and of expected
sign. Figure 1 depicts the association in the data.
5For definition of low and middle income countries, see World Bank (2002). We ex-
cluded Rwanda and China and Jordan 1989 (an outlier in military).
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Figure 1: The population growth rate and the share of the military.
The association, however, may be spurious and may merely reflect the
presence of a “common explanatory variable”. To see this, note that the
variable POPGR is strongly autocorrelated with lag of one generation. If
twenty years ago there has been an exceptionally large cohort of newborns,
a lot of people are now both in the age of making children and going to
military. Therefore, the number of children and the share of military swell
together even if no causality runs from MILPERS to POPGR. To eliminate
this cohort effect we take the population growth rate lagged with twenty
years (POPGR−20) as an independent variable to the model.
Several other explanations for population growth has been suggested.6
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) argue that an explanation for population
growth is provided in education. Some others insist that trade with rich
countries has induced demographic changes in poor countries.7 Brander and
Taylor (1998), and Maxwell and Reuveny (2000) study the Malthusian ar-
gument that fixed natural resources and population density are the main
determinants of population growth. They suggest that population density
6Lehmijoki (2003) provides a review of determinants for population growth.
7Caldwell (1982) claims that import of western values together with goods and services
tends to decrease population growth. Bongaarts and Watkins (1996) also emphasize the
role of diffusion of information. An alternative explanation for the role of trade was
provided by Haaparanta (2004) who argued that, in some cases, trade opening makes
people in a poor country to specialize to agriculture and move back to countryside where
population grows faster so that trade opening increases population growth.
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Model OLS FEM PERIOD
1 2 3
MILPERS 24.1 16.3 10.9
(5.107) (3.746) (2.47)
POPGR−20 43.3 −40.9 −39.4
(9.177) (−6.424) (−6.26)
LITERACY −2.1 −1.6 −0.3
(−9.26) (−2.948) (−0.49)
TRADE 0.3 −0.2 0.1
(3.75) (−1.077) (0.42)
DENSITY −0.1 −0.4 0.2
(−6.15) (−1.815) (0.57)
EAP 68
(7.06)
SAS 60
(4.95)
LAC 83
(8.78)
SSA 90
(7.21)
R2 .55 0.77 0.78
Table 1: Dependent variable population growth (POPGR). In OLS, het-
eroscedasticity corrected standard errors are used. All coefficients multiplied
by 100. t-values given in parenthesis.
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(or resource scarcity) sets limit to population growth. To control for all
these variables we take the literacy rate of total population (LITERACY ),
the GDP-share of international trade (TRADE), and the population density
(DENSITY ) as right hand side variables into the regression. We also intro-
duce four regional dummies namely East Asian and Pacific (EAP ), South
Asia (SAS), Latin America (LAC), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The
OLS results are given in regression 2 in Table 1.
Regression 1 shows that the association between POPGR and MILPERS
well preserves the scrutinity of several additional variables and areal dummies
and the estimate for β increases. The following two columns in Table 1
report the fixed-effect model with fixed effects allowed, and the two-way
model with both period and fixed effects allowed.8 In both these models
the coefficient for MILPERS is relatively stable.9 Hence, even if Figure 1
shows that the positive association between the military share and population
growth is not especially prominent, this association is robust. From 1989 to
1999 population growth rate decreased from 2.21% to 1.88% in the sample;
regression 3 in Table 1 then says that the decrease in the military share, which
was 0.33 percentage units during the period in question, was responsible
for about 10% of the occurred decrease in population growth rate. The
population in the countries of the sample increase from 1002 million in 1950
to 3044 million in 2000. If we assume that the results above hold for the
entire period 1950 − 2000, then political instability was responsible for the
increase in population by 2.2 million people in the sample.
Note, however, that even if we eliminated the cohort effect, the possibil-
ity of reversed causality is still present. It is possible that the causality runs
from the population growth rate to the military share. As usually, complete
elimination of the problem by instrumental estimation is difficult but some
preliminary contemplations are possible. Brander and Taylor (1998), and
Maxwell and Reuveny (2000) claim that continuous population growth nec-
8The test results 462 for the Lagrange multiplier and 120 for the Hausman test favor
FEM over OLS and the random effect model.
9Interesting feature in Table 1 is that if country-specific constants are allowed the
coefficient for POPGR−20 switches from significantly positive to significantly negative.
The explanation is that population growth is (autocorrelated and) trended. The sample
average of population growth increased until 1981 and then decreased. Allowing country-
specific constants reveals the negative correlation between trends.
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essarily leads to scarcity of natural resources such as arable land which may
lead to conflicts about access to these resources.10 Hence, we take population
density as a measure of the scarcity of land but we find that the correlation
between DENSITY and MILPERS is −0.15 which is in wrong direction:
the greater the scarcity, the lower the revealed risk for conflict. It is also pos-
sible that a fast population growth increases unemployment among young
men, and that idle, frustrated young men are potential rebels. We have
occasional data for unemployment of young men for 26 countries, but its
correlation with MILPERS (the revealed measure of risk) is only 0.06 which
is in the expected direction but small. Hence, we find no apparent evidence
for reversed causality even if this possibility cannot be completely excluded.
The model also suggests that governments facing risks for internal con-
flicts, discriminate working women to compel them to change into child-
caring. Therefore, we test whether the female participation rate (FEMLAB)
is associated with MILPERS by running
FEMLAB = ζ + η ·MILPERS + ε, (25)
to find η = −2.54 which is big and significant (t−value is −12.38). Actually,
MILPERS explains 22% of female discrimination in the sample. This result
is depicted in Figure 2.
The astonishing fact in Figure 2 is that this intermediate result seems to
stronger than the main result, namely the positive association between the
military share and population growth in Figure 1. One explanation is that
during the years for which the data is available the weight for children in
household preferences already was relatively low (i.e., θ was low, cf. propo-
sition (ii)). Hence, even if governments still were able to push women out of
the labor force, they were no more so successful in achieving their target of
population growth. If this were the case, then the the demographic effects of
political instability may earlier have been stronger, i.e., the multiplier β in
(24) was possible larger.
10Quite the opposite view is adobted by the proponents of the resource-curse argument
which says that abundant natural resources, such as diamonds, lead to civil conflicts. For
a review, see Olsson 2004.
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Figure 2: The female participation rate and the share of the military.
6 Conclusions
The existence of the military is necessary for any society, but its extent
depends on political instability. Building up the military reduces the risk of
conflicts, but also decreases the popularity of the government. Because there
is a trade-off between these two, there is an optimal rate of conscription for
a government. Consequently, the government can maintain a big military
only through keeping up high fertility. For a given rate of conscription, the
number of soldiers is the larger, the larger the cohort of young men. The
government promotes fertility by discriminating women in the labor market
in order to compel them to child-rearing. Hence, the size of the military, the
discrimination of women and the fertility rate are all positively associated.
To consider this assertion, we construct a theoretical model as follows.
Households are family dynasties, which obtain utility from consumption per
capita and the number of children, but sending children to the army deceases
its welfare. Goods are produced from capital, male labor and female labor
according to neoclassical technology with constant returns to scale. Some
female labor is allocated in child-rearing to produce young family members.
The government sets the conscription rate at which young men are taken
in the military. It also controls fertility by discriminating women in the labor
force. Because there is an equilibrium conscription rate, the government can
build up the military only through higher fertility in the long run. We test
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this assertion also empirically. The results reveal a robust positive association
between the proportion of military personnel out of population, the fertility
rate and the discrimination of women in the developing countries.
The model in this paper is the first attempt to explain the interdepen-
dence of political economy and population growth in the case the government
has to maintain the army to control for political instability in the country.
It could be extended and made more concrete as follows:
(i) The public sector could be modelled entirely, e.g. through the intro-
duction of public services (e.g. schooling) as well as specific taxes on
consumption, capital and male and female labor. It would be instruc-
tive to see whether the governments would still discriminate women
even if more policy instruments are available.
(ii) The economy could be opened such that there are two sectors producing
exported and imported goods. One of these sectors could use male
labor and the other female labor more intensively. This framework
could reveal something about the relationship of international trade,
gender discrimination, the military and fertility.
(iii) There exists a labor-intensive natural-resource sector (e.g. diamonds)
in the economy.11 This approach could explain how the discovery of
new resources affects gender discrimination, the military and fertility.
(iv) The military capacity could crowd-out labor from the productive sector.
These tasks are left for future research.
11Cf. Olsson (2004).
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Appendix
Section 2:
The uniqueness of the path of the system requires that the Hamiltonian
(7) must be strictly concave in (n, k) when c (and consequently λ = c−σ) is
kept constant. Given this and λ = c−σ, we obtain
0 < c2σ
∣∣∣∣ ∂2H∂n2 ∂2H∂n∂k∂2H
∂n∂k
∂2H
∂k2
∣∣∣∣ = c2σ ∣∣∣∣λGnn − σθ(1− a/2)1−σn−σ λGnkλGnk λGkk
∣∣∣∣
= c2σ
[
λ2(GnnGkk −G2nk)− σθ(1− a/2)1−σn−σ−1λGkk
]
= GnnGkk −G2nk − σθ(1− a/2)1−σn−σ−1cσGkk. (26)
Differentiating the system (12) totally, we obtainGk Gn + τ −1Gkk Gnk 0
Gnk Gnn − σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσn−σ−1 σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ
dkdn
dc

+
n− 1/2 1/20 0
0 0
(dτ
dh
)
= 0.
Noting (26), the Jacobian of this system is given by
J =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gk Gn + τ −1
Gkk Gnk 0
Gnk Gnn − σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσn−σ−1 σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (−1)1+3(−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−1
∣∣∣∣Gkk GnkGnk Gnn − σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσn−σ−1
∣∣∣∣
+ (−1)3+3︸ ︷︷ ︸
+1
σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ
∣∣∣∣Gk Gn + τGkk Gnk
∣∣∣∣
= G2nk −GkkGnn + σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσn−σ−1Gkk︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[
Gk︸︷︷︸
+
Gnk︸︷︷︸
−
−(Gn + τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
−c/n) Gkk︸︷︷︸
−
]
< 0.
Furthermore, we obtain
∂n
∂τ
= − 1J
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gk n− 1/2 −1
Gkk 0 0
Gnk 0 σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
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= − 1J (−1)
1+2(n− 1/2)
∣∣∣∣Gkk 0Gnk σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ
∣∣∣∣
= −(1/J ) (1/2− n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
Gkk︸︷︷︸
−
σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
∂n
∂h
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gk 1/2 −1
Gkk 0 0
Gnk 0 σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (1/J ) (1/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
Gkk︸︷︷︸
−
σθ(1− a/2)1−σcσ−1n−σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0.
Section 4:
The uniqueness of the path of the system requires that the Hamiltonian
(16) must be strictly concave in (n, k) when c (and consequently µ = c−σ) is
kept constant. Given this and µ = c−σ, we obtain
0 < c2σ
∣∣∣∣∣∂
2HG
∂n2
∂2HG
∂n∂k
∂2HG
∂n∂k
∂2HG
∂k2
∣∣∣∣∣ = c2σ
∣∣∣∣µGnn − σAn−σ−1 µGnkµGnk µGkk
∣∣∣∣
= c2σ
[
µ2(GnnGkk −G2nk)− σAn−σ−1λGkk
]
= GnnGkk −G2nk − σAn−σ−1cσGkk. (27)
Differentiating the system (23) totally, we obtain(
Gkk Gnk
σAn−σGσ−1Gk +Gnk σAn−σGσ−1(Gn −G/n) +Gnn
)(
dk
dn
)
+
(
0
n−σGσ
)
dA = 0.
Given (4) and (18), we obtain Jacobian of this system as
J =
∣∣∣∣ Gkk GnkσAn−σGσ−1Gk +Gnk σAn−σGσ−1(Gn −G/n) +Gnn
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Gkk GnkGnk Gnn − σAn−σ−1Gσ
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ Gkk GnkσAn−σGσ−1Gk σAn−σGσ−1Gn
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Gkk GnkGnk Gnn − σAn−σ−1cσ
∣∣∣∣+ σAn−σGσ−1 ∣∣∣∣Gkk GnkGk Gn
∣∣∣∣
= GkkGnn −G2nk − σAn−σ−1cσGkk︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+σAn−σGσ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
[
Gn︸︷︷︸
−
Gkk︸︷︷︸
−
− Gk︸︷︷︸
+
Gnk︸︷︷︸
−
]
> 0.
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Given this, (4) and (18), we obtain
∂n
∂A
= − 1
J
∣∣∣∣ Gkk 0σAn−σGσ−1Gk +Gnk n−σGσ
∣∣∣∣ = − 1JGkkn−σGσ > 0.
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